The notion of \proactive security" of basic primitives and cryptosystems has been introduced by Ostrovsky and Yung to deal with a very strong \mobile adversary" who may corrupt all participants (servers, each with private memory) throughout the lifetime of the system in a non-monotonic fashion (i.e. recoveries are possible), but who is not able to corrupt too many participants during any short period of time. The servers engage in a \proactive maintenance" that self-secures them against the mobile adversary that tries to learn the secret or disrupt their operation.
Introduction
We rst employ a combinatorial reduction of r-out-of-r (veri able) secret sharing (additive threshold scheme) to r-out-of-l (veri able) secret sharing (r strictly less than l). This construction allows the veri able distribution of shares of an RSA key by a key generator and also allows the rerandomization of these shares by the servers; it also simpli es the domain over which sharing is done (when compared with DDFY92]). This construction was originally designed for a speci c veri able secret sharing scheme which is based on the quadratic residue problem modulo Blum integers AGY95]. We use a simulatability argument (similar to one that was put forth in the static distribution of RSA DDFY92]) to show that the distribution of shares is secure. Finally, we employ the idea of witness-based cryptographic program checking, an idea that observed that if we allow certain correct evaluations (say of random elements) to be given, then we may be able to check new computed values without learning anything in addition to what we can compute ourselves. This work FGY96] extends Blum's methodology of program result checking to cryptographic programs where we do not allow the use of the computing device to compute on values controlled by the checker. We then develop speci c techniques that use the RSA properties (being exponentiation cipher, and having certain algebraic structure) that complete the design.
We prove the security of the combined system throughout its life time, and thus show that RSA is \proactivizable". We show that, in fact, a minority of processors (a linear fraction of them which is bounded away from half, e.g. 1/3) can be corrupted at any period. (This is not an unreasonable condition since it is also sometimes the optimal, i.e., due to classical results in distributed computing, we have to assume that at most 1/3 of the processors are corrupted in environments that have to implement agreements and broadcasts from pairwise channels for intra-server communication. ) We maintain, throughout, the security of the system against the adversary as well as the system's availability (i.e., we maintain a correct representation of the function so the system acts correctly and robustly whenever activated to compute the function). The servers operate e ciently (i.e., do not embed RSA computing circuits in their communication pattern as is done in general secure computation compilers), and employ a few rounds of communication at each update. (Only a polynomial number of bits need to be communicated in each round.) If the servers are all honest, the RSA evaluation protocol itself does not involve interaction. Such a protocol was called non-interactive by Feldman F87] . To cope with misbehavior we only need an extra round.
Model and De nitions
The following de nes the RSA functions:
De nition 2.1 Let h be the security parameter. Let key generator GE de ne a the family of RSA functions to be (e; d; N) GE(1 h ) where N is a composite number N = P Q, where P; Q are prime numbers of h=2 bits each. The exponent e and N are made public, while d = e ?1 mod (N) is kept private. 1 The RSA encryption function is public, de ned for each message M 2 Z N as: C = C(M) = M e mod N.
The RSA decryption function (also called signature function) is the inverse: M = C d mod N.
It can be performed by the owner of the private key d.
The security of the function is de ned in De nition 5.1 1 (N) = lcm(P ? 1; Q ? 1) is the smallest integer such that any element in Z N raised by (N) is the identity element.
RSA is typically de ned using (N), the number of elements in Z N , but (N) can be be used instead. Knowing a value which is a multiple of (N) implies a factorization of N and breaking RSA.
Our system model is similar to that of the proactive secret sharing model of HJKY95] (motivated by the initial modeling in OY91]), but modi ed to incorporate the function sharing model of DDFY92] (motivated by the idea of threshold cryptography DF89]). The system consists of l servers fs 1 ; : : :; s l g and a function f x for some key x. The system is synchronized and there are two types of time periods repeated in sequence: an update period (odd times) and an operational period (even times). The intent of the system is re ected in two properties:
Function sharing: When k uncorrupted servers are active, the shared function f x can be reconstructed to compute f x ( ) (availability), yet nothing about f x is revealed other than f x ( ) (security). (This extends threshold secret sharing to functions where the function is applied many times. It enhances the system security space-wise, by forcing the adversary to compromise many server locations holding the function key).
Mobile adversary property: An adversary A can have control of any server at any time period and we consider a server that is corrupted during an update phase as being corrupted during both its adjacent periods. A corrupt server gives the adversary access to its memory and acts arbitrarily. A server that recovers from the adversary restarts from a fresh state. We assume the adversary is k 0 -restricted, meaning that it can corrupt at most k 0 servers during any time period.
(This further forces the adversary to corrupt many servers at a short period of time, thus further increasing the system's security in the time domain).
Hence, unlike secret sharing (which is a one-time reveal operation), security is maintained and the secrecy of the function holds throughout, even though the mobile adversary may have access to all of the servers throughout the lifetime of the system (albeit, no more than k 0 simultaneously at a round).
In what follows we discuss informally some of the issues and assumptions in our model.
The communication model:
The communication model is very much like that of HJKY95]. The l servers communicate via an authenticated bulletin board CF85] in a synchronized manner. The board is accessible by a Gateway (combining function) that can be assumed to be an insecure gateway that produces the nal function result. We assume that the adversary cannot jam communication. The board assumption models an underlying basic communication protocol (authenticated broadcasts) and allows us to disregard the low level technical details.
Time periods: Time is divided into time periods which are determined by the common global clock (e.g., a day, a week, etc.). There are two types of time periods repeated in sequence: an update period (odd times) and an operational period (even times). During the update period the servers engage in an interactive update protocol. At the end of an update period the servers hold new shares (which are used during the following operational period).
Adversary: We assume that our adversary is computationally bounded and therefore can not break any of the underlying encryption, signatures and veri able secret sharing primitives used. Let the history H contain (1) a list L of message/signature pairs that the adversary obtains before the system is run, and (2) a sequence of corruptions and signature requests (from messages in L) that the adversary will perform. At any time period no more than k 0 servers are corrupted and if a server is corrupted during an update period we consider it corrupt at the operational periods before and after that update period. The adversary also collects everything >from the public channel and stores all information gained in its view during its attack on the system.
Note that A operates dynamically, changing the memory of servers it controls, or forcing servers it controls to send messages, depending on the current view A . (However, note that it is nonadaptive in its choice of when and which servers to corrupt and when and which signature requests to perform.) Also note that when the adversary no longer controls a server, it is \removed" by an underlying system management (that server is \rebooted" by the other servers). We assume at that point that the server is authenticated as a rejoining server to the system (as any cryptographic system must rely on initial minimal authentication of parties).
Robustness: The existence of the adversary does not make the system unavailable; at any moment the servers can compute correctly a required signature on an authorized input.
Challenge stage: To argue security we challenge the adversary after it has attacked the system.
Speci cally, after the attack phase, the adversary is challenged by a message (that it does not control and was not part of the history) which it attempts to sign.
We now give a more formal model of correctness and security for proactive RSA (which can easily be generalized to other one-way or trapdoor functions). The de nitions and explanations of the subprotocols in the de nitions above will be given in the next section. The system above assures the availability of the function (the function can be produced at any time as there are correct representation available at good servers (correctness), and misbehavior is caught or prevented from infuencing the outcome (veri ability). The protocol is to be polynomial time throughout and the information available at servers should be kept small (rather than allowed to grow exponentially say), in fact we assure boundedness throughout.
Next we de ne what does it means for the system to be secure. Each share will be associated with a subset of servers such that our system will perform as required.
In particular, no subset of servers of size k 0 l(1=2 ? ) will be associated with all the shares of any duplicate of the private key. The assignment (initially given in AGY95]) into subsets can be chosen at random by the dealer (or by the servers e ciently). To achieve function sharing on input message M, a gateway G obtains from the servers possessing a t i;j the value M a t i;j , and hence G can compute The shares will be unchanged during intervals of time that we call operational periods, and between these operation periods there will be update periods (Section 3.4) where (a) the good shares are renewed and (b) corrupted shares are recovered. We renew and recover shares by creating shares of shares and distributing them appropriately.
To provide for robustness, we give a witness (similar to FGY96]) to check intermediate function results that provide the proactivization of the protocol. For instance we must assure that everyone gets valid shares of d during updates. We perform computations based on a witness element to verify the correctness.
Important remark: In all of these protocols, every message that is broadcast is also signed by the sender using a secure signature scheme, and any message with an invalid signature is ignored. The rst eld in any message is simply a tag to indicate the type of message. Individual signatures are renewed throughout, though, as was mentioned, we need an initial authentication token to be available for recovering servers. (Any cryptosystem relies on initial authenticated granting of cryptographic tools.) We can assume that all the signed messages originate at the correct server; otherwise, the assumption about the security of the underlying signature scheme is violated.
Initialization Protocol

Family and Committee Assignments
We rst distribute shares in multiple r-out-of-r secret sharing protocols. This technique is essentially from AGY95]. The assignment of families and committees can be done by the dealer (rather than among the servers as in AGY95], but can also be done by the servers). Let S = fs 1 ; : : :; s l g be the set of servers and F = fF 1 ; : : :; F m g be the set of families, where each F i = fC i;1 ; : : :; C i;r g is a set of committees of servers. Each committee is of size c. Let I = f1; : : :; mg and J = f1; : : :; rg be the indices of families and committees, respectively. The parameters m, r, and c are chosen such that the result will be an -terri c assignment, that is, one that obeys the following properties for any set of \bad" servers B S with jBj k 0 l(1=2 ? ):
1. For all i 2 I, there exists a j 2 J such that B \C i;j = ;. (For each family there is one committee with no bad servers which we call an excellent committee.) 2. For at least 90 percent of i 2 I, for all j, (S n B) \ C i;j 6 = ;. (In 90 percent of the families, all committees have at least one good server. We call a family F i with this property a good family.) Given l, , and security parameter h maxf2l + 2; 100g, we will set c = df2 log h= log(1 + )ge, r = (2 + ) c =h, and m = 10h.
It was shown that:
Lemma 3.1 ( AGY95]) A randomly chosen assignment is -terri c with overwhelming probability.
We can control the probability of obtaining a non--terri c assignment to be smaller than that of breaking the RSA function given the security parameter. Note that once we have terri c assignment, any choice of \bad servers" is allowed{ which is important in the mobile adversary case.
The dealer generates the assignment and broadcasts it to the servers (or the protocol in AGY95] is used to generate the assignment by the servers themselves)
The assignment communication protocol runs as follows:
1. The servers generate public/private key pairs, and broadcast their public keys (authenticated with their renewable authenticated token{ modeling their trusted hardware based mechanism or trusted channels). 2. The server with the smallest ID in each committee generates a public/private key pair, broadcasts the public key, and broadcasts encrypted copies of the private key using the public keys of the other servers in the committee.
The keys distributed are used in a secure (probabilistic) encryption ( GM84, L96]) so that they generate private channels between the sender of messages and the holder(s) of the private key.
As a result we can immediately see that:
Lemma 3.2 ( AGY95]) The preceding protocol gives the servers in an -terri c assignment a public/private key pair for each committee, and further: excellent committees have secure key. Notation: For each (i; j) 2 I J, ENC i;j ( ) will denote an encryption of using the public key of C i;j . For all s 2 S, ENC s ( ) will denote a probabilistic encryption of using the public key of server s. Remember, in our model the adversary is computationally bounded and thus it is assumed that it does not have capability to break these underlying primitives, i.e. it cannot get more than a negligible advantage in computing any function of by seeing the encryption of it.
Distributing the secret
The dealer generates an RSA instance (e; d; N) and broadcasts a witness (g; g d ) of the function to the servers, where g has maximal order, (N). This witness is used later on to determine if servers have correct shares (witness-based checking is based on the fact that having some random function values do not help in breaking the cryptographic (RSA) function). The dealer then broadcasts a message which contains, for each committee C i;j , an encrypted a 0 i;j (using C i;j 's public key) and g a 0 i;j (used as a public witness to the share a 0 i;j ).
We can assume that the initial distribution is correct as we trust the dealer. Then, although we assume that the dealer is trusted, we could design a protocol in which the servers can actually guarantee the robustness of the system (i.e., that they can sign messages properly), even if the dealer acts incorrectly. (We cannot, however, guarantee the security of the system, since the dealer could simply send the value d to the adversary.)
The correctness of the shares is veri ed (with respect to the function witness g d ) using, e.g., a procedure similar to one in Feldman F87] . (It is not known how to generate e ciently RSA keys by the servers themselves; the only high-probability veri able solution involve general secure computation OY91] and are therefore not e cient). We can also check the structure of the key e ciently (to some extent). This robust protocol would have the dealer choose (and prove that it has chosen) N such that N = p c 1 q c 2 , as there is an e cient proof system for this fact GHY] . We can then have the servers collectively and e ciently choose log 3 h random elements in Z N , to be used (independently) in place of g throughout the protocol. We do not consider this a major issue since the system is insecure when the dealer is corrupt. Let us review the dealer's protocol. 
Signature Protocol (for round 2t)
This is the protocol to be followed when the gateway obtains a message M to be signed in round 2t. This protocol follows the one in FGY96]. We use the fact that since d = P j2J a t i;j then M d Q j2J M a t i;j mod N. We also need to verify correctness of the results using a witness. 3. For all (i; j) 2 I J, each server s 0 2 C i;j checks each message SIGN.2; s; i; j; r i;j ] to see if r i;j M a 2t i;j mod N. If not, then it broadcasts the challenge SIGN.CHALLENGE; s 0 ; i; j; a 2t i;j ]. 2 We assume here that the order of g is maximal (i.e., (N)). Finding such a g may not always be feasible. In such a case we suggest choosing log 3 h random elements in Z N rather than one g because the probability a random element in Z P is a generator is c= log log P . To modify our protocol perform the same operation independently for each of the random elements throughout our protocol. We simplify our notation by using a single g since in practice the factorization of P ? 1 and Q ? 1 are known and the dealer can then nd with overwhelming probability a single g with the desired property.
(If bad members of a committee send wrong messages, it is not an excellent committee and we can open its key shares).
4. All servers verify all challenges (by checking if b 2t i;j g a 2t i;j mod N) and inform the system management of any bad servers (i.e., those servers that sent a message with r i;j 6 M a 2t i;j mod N). 5. For some good family i, the gateway computes Q j2J r i;j M d mod N. There is a vast majority of good committees that will give this value.
3.4 Update Protocol (for round 2t + 1)
Key Renewal
The public/private key pairs of each server are renewed as follows. 2. If any server detects two messages from any server s, it informs the system management.
The public/private key pairs of each committee are renewed as follows (after the public/private keys of the servers have been renewed). 2. Each server decides the correct shares by majority, and informs the system management about the servers that presented incorrect shares.
Share Renewal/Lost Share Recovery
We have one protocol that handles share renewal and lost share recovery. (For e ciency, one could streamline this protocol, or separate the protocols.) Note that possibly ten percent of the families have committees that contained all bad servers who erased those committees' shares. Those families would not be able to reconstruct the secret d, and thus all the shares in those families are useless. In our protocol, these useless shares will be replaced by shares of shares from a good family. Actually, each family's shares will be replaced by shares of shares from a good family, and thus all shares will be renewed.
To create the new shares for a family F i 0, every family sends shares of its shares to the committees in F i 0. F i 0 takes the shares of shares of some family (which it veri es to be valid) and creates its new shares by summing these shares of shares in each committee.
This type of share recovery is unlike the share recovery protocols in previous proactive schemes. In HJKY95], the properties of secret-sharing polynomials are used to recover a lost share using other servers' shares. By \blinding" the secret-sharing polynomials with polynomials that evaluate to zero at the appropriate point, the lost share can be recovered while no information is revealed. The closest analogue to this approach in our system would be to recover a bad family's shares by having another family blind its own shares (by shares that add to zero), and sending these \blinded shares" to the bad family. However, it can be shown that this type of approach is insecure. In AGY95], each committee is required to share its share in the same fashion as the original secret, so its share can be recovered if it is lost. This requires each server to have a very large secure memory to hold all the shares of shares for the duration of a round. In our protocol, only the original shares need to be stored at the servers. Now we describe the protocol 6. All servers check all accusations and inform the system management of any bad servers. Again, from this point on, we only deal with messages from the good servers. 
Proof of Robustness
We will show that the proactive RSA system from Section 3 is robust as de ned. It will be implied by two conditions: correctness (of the function representation), and veri ability (of correctness of evaluations), throughout. We will then show that the sizes of the shares are bounded throughout.
Theorem 4.1 The proactive RSA system above is robust against any k 0 -restricted adversary A. Proof: We say the system is correct at time 2t when d P j2J a 2t i;j mod (N) for all good families F i . (We note that the majority agreement on b 2t i;j implies that all good servers in a committee C i;j will either agree on one share a 2t i;j or agree they have none.)
We say that the system is veri able at time 2t if given the outputs of all the committees in all the families, the opened shares fa 2t i;j g C i;j was challenged , and the public witnesses fb 2t i;j g (i;j)2I J ; the gateway G can pick the correct shares of all good committees. Veri ability implies that the gateway G can identify good family, and compute M d Q j2J M a 2t i;j mod N for a good family F i .
Together, correctness and veri ability imply robustness.
With overwhelming probability we have an assignment that for any choice of k 0 (at any time unit)
we have 90 percent of the families being good. The existence of a good family is guaranteed by the assignment of servers to committees due to Lemma 3.2.
Assume correctness at time 2t, then for each committee C i;j with bad servers, our protocol allows a good server on that committee to prove its function-evaluation share, M a 2t i;j , to be correct (by veri ability, since if there are di erences, the share itself is opened). Thus, G can collect the right exponents and indeed produce a (correct) signature.
Therefore, we need only prove (by induction on t) that 8t, the system is correct and veri able at round 2t.
Since we assume the dealer is trusted (i.e., acting correctly), then the initial distribution of shares is de ned in such a way that for any (good) family F i , the shares sent to the committees of F i will have the property that d P j2J a 0 i;j mod (N), and there will be a good server on each committee C i;j to store the value a 0 i;j . Thus, the system is correct at round 0. Also, the public values fb 0 i;j g (i;j)2I J , are correct (i.e., for all committees C i;j , b 0 i;j g a 0 i;j mod N), and g is a maximal order element modN. Remark: The de nition above assumed security with respect to a history H, namely with respect to known cleartext-ciphertext pairs. When H is empty, this is the traditional de nition of security of RSA.
We have chosen the known ciphertext case to simplify the proof by reduction. In secure applications (secure signatures and encryption and in secure protocols) H consists of cleartext-ciphertext pairs where ciphertexts (signature values) are from a polynomial-time samplable distribution, which is equivalent to the empty H case, due to the public availability of the encryption function. We chose this de nition, since the application (protocol or cryptosystem) should de ne the content of the history with respect to a single signer; whereas the goal of our security proof is to show that when the signer is replaced by the servers, the security is preserved.
Lemma 5.1 Let h be the security parameter. Let G be a family of RSA functions with security parameter h. Let S(e; d; N) be a system that satis es the robustness property of a proactive RSA system. If, for any probabilistic polynomial-time k 0 -restricted adversary A, and for any history H containing a polynomial-size list L of (message,signature) pairs and a polynomial-size sequence of corruptions and signature requests, there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time simulator simu(e; n; A; H) such that 
The Simulator
The above lemma stated that if there is a simulator, the system is secure (as de ned in de nition 2.3.
Here, to complete the proof of security, we construct SIM to simulate the view of A with history H in the system we construct in Section 3.
For simulation purposes, SIM will assume that all servers are controlled by A for the maximum time that the security requirements assume they are corrupted, i.e., if A controls server s sometime during round 2t + 1, then it also controls s all during rounds 2t; 2t + 1; 2t + 2, and if A controls server s sometime during round 2t, then it also controls s all during round 2t. 
Lost Share Detection Simulation
The servers perform lost share detection exactly as in the real protocol.
Share Renewal/Lost Share Recovery Simulation
Simulating the Share Renewal/Lost Share Recover Protocol is done as in the original protocol except as follows. Assume it is the start of round 2t+1. Say F i 0 is the family whose shares must be recovered. In step 5, for all (i; i 0 ) 2 I I, no server s 2 C i 0 ;j 0 i 0 broadcasts an accusation of any server s 0 2 C i;j i .
Proof that the Simulation and the Real Protocol are Indistinguishable
We reduce the problem to proving that the unencrypted parts of the real and simulated views are statistically indistinguishable. We use semantically secure probabilistic encryption GM84].
Lemma 5.2 If the adversary A is restricted to probabilistic polynomial time and if the servers are using semantically secure (probabilistic) encryption (in which distinguishing between encryptions of two given messages is di cult), then: If views from executions of the real and simulated protocols assuming secure communication channels are statistically indistinguishable, then views from executions of the real and simulated protocols using semantically secure encryption are polynomial-time indistinguishable.
Proof: First we note that if views from executions of the real and simulated protocols assuming secure communication channels are statistically indistinguishable, then views from executions of the real and simulated protocols including encryptions of zero in place of the true encryptions are also statistically indistinguishable. Now the true simulated protocol using semantically secure encryption is polynomial-time indistinguishable from the zero-encryption simulated secure channel protocol, by the semantically secure encryption assumption, and using a standard hybrid (walking) method. By the same reasoning, the true real protocol is polynomial-time indistinguishable from the zero-encryption real secure channel protocol. Now assume there is a polynomial-time distinguisher T between the real and simulated protocols. Let P r , P s , P r;z , and P s;z be the probability T outputs one given the view from a real protocol, a simulated protocol, a real protocol with zero-encryption, and a simulated protocol with zeroencryptions. Recall that poly(h) denotes any polynomial in h. From above, jP r ? P r;z j < 1=poly(h), jP r;z ? P s;z j < 1=poly(h), and jP s ? P s;z j < 1=poly(h). Then jP r ? P s j < 1=poly(h), and thus the real Proof: To simplify the proof we make the following assumptions (without loss of overall correctness):
1. we assume that A's random bits are xed. We will show that, for every assignment of A's random bits, the two views are indistinguishable.
2. we assume, that for all i and even times 2t, A sees all shares except a 2t i;j 2t ) di (X; X sim ).
Proof:
The following parts of the view are exactly determined by X (or X sim in the simulation) g, g d , the history tape, and A's random bits. They therefore make no contribution to the statistical di erence Furthermore, the families of initial shares are independent and therefore, the di erences between them can be summed. Only upon failure does it continue to consider the next family.
